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On 7 July 1980 a motion for a resolution (Doc. 1-280/80) on a 
European policy for the motor industry, tabled by Mr PININFARINA pursuant 
to Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure, was referred to the Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs as the committee responsible and to the 
Committee on External Economic Relations for its opinion~ 
On 10 July 1980 a motion for a resolution (Doc. 1-311/80) on the 
future of the car industry, tabled by Mr SARRE ann others pursuant to 
Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure, was referred to the Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affair~ as the committee responsible and to the 
committee on External Economic Relations and the committee on social 
Affairs and Employment for their opinions. 
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs appointed 
Mr B~CINI rapporteur on Doc. 1-280/80 at its meeting of 16 July 1980 
and on Doc. 1-311/80 at its meeting of 23 September 1980. It decided 
to deal with the two motions in a single report on the European automobile 
industry. 
It considered the report at its meeting of 24/25 November and 
1/2 December. 
At its meeting of 1/2 December it adopted the motion fo~ a ~esolution 
by 19 votes to 0 with 1 abstention. 
Present: Mr Delors, chairman: Mr de Ferranti, vice-chairman, 
Mr Deleau, vice-chairman: Mr Bonaccini, rapporteur: Mr Beazley, 
Mr Beumer, Mr von Bismarck, Mr Caborn, Mr Carossino (deputizing for 
Mr Piquet), Mr Damseaux (deputizing for Mr Combe), Mr Delorozoy, 
Miss Forster, Mr de Goede, Mr Leonardi, Mr J. Moreau, Mr Nyborg, 
Mr Petronio, Sir Brandon Rhya-Williams, Mr Spinelli (deputizing for 
Mr Fernandez) and Mr von Wogau. 
The opinions of the Canmittee on External Econcxnic Relations and 
the Committee on Social Affairs and Bmpl~ent are attached. 
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A 
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs hereby submits to the 
European Parliament the following motion for a resolution, together with 
explanatory statement: 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on the European automobile industry 
The European Pa~liament, 
- havin~ re~ard to the motion for a resolution (Doc. 1-280/80) tabled by 
Mr Pininfarina pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure and the 
motion (Doc. 1-311/80) tabled by Mr Sarre and others pursuant to Rule 14 
of the Rules of Procedure, 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on ~onomic and Monetary 
Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on External Economic Relations 
and the Committee on Social Affairs and Employment (Doc. 1-673/80), 
having regard to the key importance of this sector in European 
industry and to the economy as a whole, 
- having regard to the disturbing loss of markets both within and 
outside the Community as a result of the trade offensive by aggressive 
non-community industries, 
- having regard t~ the serious effects this is having on employment, 
income distribution and the general economic health of the community, 
particularly for certain regions and in sectors linked to or dependent 
on the car industry, 
_ convinced that the car industry can instil new dynamism and growth 
into the European economy and that appropriate community measures could 
prove very effective in this field, 
community strategy 
1. urgently calls for the formulation, at Community level, of a strategy 
for the automobile industry that will enable it to take advantage of 
the size of the community market, the economic and political strength 
of the community and its.extensive trading links with the rest of 
the world: 
2. considers that the strategy ad~ted should be such as to allow the 
attainment of the fundamental objectives, which are to increase the 
productivity of the European automobile industry and to strengthen 
its competitiveness on the world market: 
3. Calls upon the Commission when fulfilling its executive functions to 
grant the necessary priority to studying and drafting proposals relating 
to the automobile industry: 
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4. Urgently calls for close cooperation between the national governffients 
and the Community institutions with a view to creating the basic 
conditions necessary for improving the common market, and insists 
on the need for steps to be taken to achieve greater harmonization 
of the .laws of the Member States, the coordination of na~ional aid 
.. 
schemes and the elimination of technical barriers to trade~ 
5. In order to speed up the adoption of the most appropriate common meaEures, 
requests the Commission to conduct, as rapidly as possible, a survey of 
the effects of Community regulations on energy saving, safety and pollution 1 
6. Calls for a greater investment of private risk capital, and considers that 
any Community intervention should be on the basis of the coordination of 
national programmes and with particular use being made of instruments 
such as the new Community loans: 
7. Asks its committee to monitor continuously developct~ents in this sector 
and to draft a report on this subject periodically~ 
External trade poliey 
8. Requests the Commission to pay particularly close attention to further 
developments in the talks between the representatives of the European and 
Japanese manufacturers. It should see to it that the internal market · 
is afforded adequate protection, in particular through its contacts and 
negotiations with the third countries concerned. The purpose of this is 
to ensu:a improved market access in particular through the removal of 
spurious obstacles to trade, under conditions of effective equality ar. 
well as balanced exchange rates, especially against the yen and with 
fewer divergences in matters affecting industrial relations. If these 
contacts an~ negotiations fail to secure the necessary results, the 
community must quickly adopt the measures that are essential for the 
legitimate protection of its market: 
9. Hopes that the Council will adopt the Commission proposal for a 
directive introducing a spec~l procedure for community certification 
of industrial products from third countries; 
10. Considers that a thorough appraisal should be made of the implications 
for the community automobile industry of the enlargement of the 
Community and calls for an improvement in the trade balance between 
Spain and the EEC in this sector; 
11. Enjoins the Community to examine and take account of the implications of 
the buy-back agreements concluded with third countries that manufacture cars: 
12. Considers that the community's competition policy must be viewed not 
merely in an intra-community context, but also in the light of the 
need to ensure that undertakings are able to compete effectively and 
on an equal footing with third country ~ufacturers: 
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Problems associated with the common market 
13. Urgently calls upon the Council to adopt the directives designed to 
eliminate technical barriers to trade in motor vehicles and the propo&al 
concerning a special procedure 
products from third countries: 
proposals have been adopted, a 
far Community certification of industrial 
points out that, once all the above 
Community type-approval certificate for 
motor vehicles will effectively be possible; such a type approval 
procedure will give the Community an important bargaining position within 
the new GATT agreements for reciprocity on non-tariff barriers; 
14. Asks that genuinely effective measures be taken to harmonize the 
existing legislation of the Member States concerning the technical 
characteristics of motor vehicles, especially from the point of 
view of inspection and control, making allowance for likely 
developments in the l980sr 
15. Calls on the Commission to ensure that competition is maintained in 
this sector so that consumers in the Community are assured of a supply 
of vehicles at appropriate prices; 
16. Reaffirms the need for the current work on the harmonization of 
the laws relating to car insurance to be brought to a rapid 
conclusion and calls for an analysis of the different fiscal 
provisions at present applicable to the sale and the use of cars 
in the variQus Member States, 
17. Points out that removing barriers within the Community makes it easier 
for smaller specialist firms in assembling, components and research 
and development to flourish and thereby create jobs and contribute to 
the competitiveness of the entire industry; 
Research and development 
18. Expresses concern at the fact that Community research and 
development activity may not be up to the level of that of 
the leading third country competitors, and considers that the 
Community should encourage and assist such activity, while also 
coordinating national research projects and playing a direct 
part in 'non-competitive' research directly linked to the 
industry as well as in basic research in the sector; 
19. Calls for a strengthening of the Community's role in the promotion 
of research into the fundamental problems and subsequent development 
of electronic technology: 
- 7 - PE 68.264/fin. 
20. While reaffirming the importance of all aspects of research, lays 
particular stress on research which is concerned with energy saving, 
the use of energy sources other than hydrocarbons and the search 
for alternative materials: 
21. Points out that the requisite technological innovations must also 
be directed towards increasing the safety of consumers and workers 
and towards improving both the working and the natural environment: 
22. Calls for thorough studies of the precise costs involved in the 
pursuit of these three objectives and of the combination of priorities 
that may prove to be necessary: 
Industrial structure 
23. Urgently calls for an end to be put to the fragmentation of the 
community industries, by the adoption of measures aimed at 
encouraging fuller cooperation between companies through joint 
programmes covering research, experimentation and components and 
motor vehicle production as well as other forms of collaboration 
and joint ventures wi~in the Community and with undertakings in 
third countries, such as would help improve European production 
and deserve to be approved and supported. While concentrations 
may also have their drawbacks, they should positively be encouraged 
in suitable cases (for example, in certain sectors of the components 
industry), when the result would be substantial economies of scale 
and a better organization of the production process: 
24. While stressing the Community's openness to foreign investment, draws 
the attention of the community to the effects of foreign investment 
within the community and of Community investment abroad: 
25. Believes that foreign investment within the Community can in 
particular help to create new jobs but could also lead to 
Europe's technological dependence being increased, and calls 
upon the Commission to guard against this possibility: calls 
attention to three essential conditions that must be 
considered jointly in cases of joint ventures with third 
country under.takings: tile Community firm must not be weakened 
to such an extent that there is reason to fear that it may be 
absorbed by its partners: its capital share must represent a 
prepondere.nt proportion of tlB value of the final product : 
the in~ervention of the partner company must not be purely 
commercial in nature: 
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26. Weleomes on principle investments by European automobile manufacturers 
in third countries :a.nd considers it _neces~ry f~, the canmunity to lend 
suppor.t to such efforts-On a lon9-term b~~i~ by ~oncluding capital 
. . 
protection agreements with these countries: 
27. Reaffirms the need for n~ .-prograDIID8s 6£ teehnological development 
'... .' ,. 
on a broad scale,based s~a~ely on aufom~ti.on techniques and the 
,, . . . . 
use of robots, and to identify'tne best~fuethods.of organizing 
production and of simplifying compo~ent" assembly processes and 
stockpili~ policies~ These.programmes and th~ studies preceding 
" . /' , ~ . . . . 
tnem must be _promoted, -:ncouraged and adequately supported, having 
dqe regard ~~ .the poss~le social consequenees: .. 
28.. Request~ the. commission t~ ·a-scertain 'wh.at piactical scope there 
. • •;.t. ' ' .... 
is . for an agreement between .. ~roducers of components, insurance 
companies and organization~ of vehicle repairers to expedite, 
sta~ardi~e and reduce the cost of the procedures followed for 
. '• . .... .. -: ... .. 
repairing vehicles and settling claims; · 
Social aspects 
. tr.,. 
29. ·Recognizes that the adjqstment of t~e ~Qtomobil~ industry to new 
.. . . ·- ' 
·· circumstances will· haw ser.i~up ii!Ocia~ . implicat~ons and stresses the 
~ . · ... 
need for the simultaneous implementation of comprehensive measures to 
'cope with'··tbem· in a .satisfa~tory-.ma~er; 
. ·' 
30. considers that the Community should play an important part in this 
area, ~ evaluating the effects on employment and working conditions 
of restructuring schemes, of organizational changes in the production 
process and of technological innovation, especially increased 
automation, on the production line1 
31. calls for consultations with the social partners with a view to 
diagnosing the problems in the sector, comparing information, 
facilitating cooperation at European level, especially in the 
comp·onents ·sector, and formulating the training· and redeployment 
policies necessitated by developments on the automobile market: 
32. Believes that tbe Community will be able to make a special 
contribution in various fundamental areas ~: 
(a) facilitating the flow of preliminary information to the trade 
unions and to the whole work-force, and the joint assessment 
~ the social partners of employment prospects and of changes 
in conditions of employment; 
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(b) ad~ptiri.g at an early 4at• the guidelines envisaged for 
reorganizing •nd a4jus~1ng wo~•ing hours andf in particular, 
fen introduein9 a flexible retirement policy: 
(c) al!opting at ~e .e.lliAI tiM - in particuJ.ar with the help of 
the Social Fun<! - measure111 for professional training and 
r•training, etci:., witb a view to facilitating mobility on the 
hbou; market: 
(d) expediting and ..Uppottinq t~o85e mo~sures that are essential 
at r~gional leyel.to ·prevent very serious damage to the areas 
affected by t~se •••urea an4 the deterioration of their 
iMustrial s~l'ucturils and to epsure tha:~ account is taken, in 
any al1oea~i.on of ·r~sources, of the regional imbalances that 
_persist witnil\ the O>~nitya 
33. Urgently calls for .a·n increa~Jingly modern and effective public 
transport policy which \dU. h•lp to make sub.-tantial improvements 
in traffic 1y.ste~, ~sJ»foiaUy in the larc;J~ conurbations, and which, 
by pj:c;u11oting a wi~.t ring'• of t~ansport facilities, will allow people 
to make a fr~er at\0 ~• iati.<mal choice ana guarantee smoother 
l»assenger tr.effic tlow• and less u•e of the expensive motor car: 
. ' . 
34. I.nstruG!t• ·its Preitaat:tr)•· lo~a t.bit re•~lution and the attached 
. ; - ' 
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B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The automobile industry is clearly a key industry for the Community, 
both in its own right and in its wid~r impacts on other industries 
and the economy in general. 
2. It is currently the cause of considerable concern within the 
CoiiJi;.unity. Recently, two hearings were held by camnittees of the 
Eurorean Parliament on the current problems faced by the European 
automobile industry: one by the Camnittee on External Economic 
Relations on 22 September, the other by the Camnittee on Economic 
nnd Mone~~rv Affairs on 20 Vctober. Representatives of the European 
manufacturers' associations and trade unions participated in both 
hearings. 
3. What emerged most clearly was that there were shorter term and longer 
term issues. In the short term a cyclical downturn within the 
industry itself, and within the economy in general, combined with a 
greatly increased Japanese offensive on the European market, is having 
a severe impact on the industry. The immediate problems, therefore, 
are what to do about the worsening situation in this sector and how 
to cope with the increase in international competition and the social 
consequences that are now becoming apparent. 
-t 'I'h.lil inuned.; '\te crlsle~, however, is also focussing attent~ "lll on thf 
c.'l..'rrent ~t .. ·uC"turE' of the Community automobile inouE~t::ry C\r1 <. 
-vhetbe1~ .it. will .be able to compete effectively in the lone .• ~1· i ,._,l ~ 
at: a tilue oi er&eLgy ..:onstraints, and of slower unaerlying growth 
in demann and -nen competition, not just from Japan but from a 
pc.,te-nT.iC\J.ly revivE'd American industry and from new producers in 
Eastern Europe and developing countries is likely to intensify. 
The longer term problems are how best to improve Community 
~roductivity and maintain or expand competitivity and the nature 
of the respective roles that need to be played by the industry 
lt;self, l:y naticr.al governments and by Community institutions. 
5. But if the nature of the problems emerged clearly from the hearings 
the same could not be said of specific proposals for either the 
shorter or longer term sets of issues. 
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6. This report examines the questions outli~ed above 
and reviews the measu~es that might be taken at Community 
level. The first section outlines the importance of the industry 
for the Community, the s~cond looks at the changes affecting the 
industry worldwide and more specifically within the Community, the 
third at 1-be structurl\l problems facing the community and the 
fourth some of the policy choices that might be taken and the 
areas where more rigorous study is needed. It should be pointed cut 
that the .. :ep<'r': .,ak.~f' _--~,,. ~pecific references t•? the commercial 
vehicle sectoT. !'Or Jcu~.; j :. specifically examine the situation of 
the sme-ller sp-1cia~ized '7'::on·,;.facturers. 
I. If.lPOFTANCE OF THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY FOR THE C_OMI-ii.i'I;ITY 
7. Concern about the automobile industry withip the Community is 
closcdj' ln~Jv~.i tu its si7.e and to its importa;,:t.. · . rithin the 
- ·"' '-.h~ s that ensures t:'ha+.., ~'"--,en in the abs~ ,-.. ··,: 
of long term structural problems, shorter terro o.t cyclical trends 
c::r. havr. FIUC'l> s""ver('> ecc-nomic and, in particular, employment impacts. 
8. The Community in 1979 was the world's largest vehicle producer, 
in first place by quite a long way in the production of private 
vehicles though only in third place (behind Japan and the United 
States) in the production of commercial vehicles. 
9. The industry is vital in a number of respects: 
11~~ar J.:-l -;: 'r.li,J.l ioP r.mpJ.oyees are directly employed in the 
ir a}.l }-,a 'lie jobs linked to motor vehicles: 
betwee11 5/o and B% of total industrial production wLt.nL 
c..om.'nunit.t is attributable to the automobile sect.:.:>1:; 
<"'.'t~":T-.htl"" ~xports account for betwen 8% and 12% of the 
industria1. ~xpor.tF~ of the different Member States 1 
The fbreign exchange earnings are very larqe. 
10. Apart from the direct effects, the automobile industry has a broad 
~~"''lti-rlit.·r effect 'll.'ithin the economy as a whole, on both upstream 
ar.d dOY.'llstream activity, on goods and services. Energy and raw 
materials suppliers, the suppliers of steel, plastics, glass, 
1 The figures quoted above are derived from the Commission staff 
paper 'the European Motor Vehicle Industry: Information on 
t'le current situation' (SEC (80) 1381) 
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various component manufacturers large and small, automobile 
dealers and the transport industry as a whole, are all affected. 
Research in West Germany 1 indicates that 'an increase in final 
demand for automobiles by, say, 1 million units of account 
results in a rise of total output in the German economy 
(including the automotive industry) by 2 mil·lion units of account. 
This is an above-average value if compared with other manufacturing 
industries' • 
11. The share in total output of a number of West German industries 
of products and services supplied directly and indirectly to the 
automobile industry has been estimated 2 as around 25% for the 
rubber and asbestos industry, around 25% for steel processing 
(investment goods), around 15-20% for iron and steel (basic goods) 
around 1~~ each for glassware and for non-ferrous metals and 
between 5 and 10% for mechanical engineering, electrical 
engineering and synthetics. 
12. The Commission's study estimates that the car industry uses 20% 
of· the total Community production of steel. 
13. 'Every car made in Britain· contains around £54 worth of ICI 
products - fibres for seat covers, paint for the body, plastics 
for the hoses and soda ash in the glass. The recent surge in car 
imports has cost ICI £20 million in lost sales'. (Sunday Times-
26 October 1980). A recent study of Ford UK forecasts that 
500,000 to 800,000 jobs could be lost in the space of a few years 
if the decline of the industry could not be halted. 
14. As regards downstream activity, the Commission's recent working 
3 document points out that 'Europe has 500,000 motor vehicle 
trade and maintenance undertakings, including 50,000 agents, 
employing perhaps about 2,900,000 people~ 
Input - output study by R. Pischner quoted in Koopman 
'The challenges of the future and adjustment strategies 
of European car makers', page 4. 
2 Koopman (page 4) quoting Diekmann 
3 
'Information on the current situation'- 13 October 1980 
(SEC(80) 1381) 
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15. A further point of emphasis is tr.at certai~ =~~ies and regions 
are particularly dependent on the inc~stry, a~d are 
disproportionately affected in periods of trouble, a good example 
being Turin. 
16. The automobile industry has been at the centre of European 
industrial growth in the post-war period. In a number of cases 
it is also strongly linked with national prestige and with 
national economic performance. I~ is not surprising that recent 
changes within the industry are currently the subject of so much 
debate. However, there is every reason to feel confident that the 
car industry can instil new dynamism and growth into the European 
econ·omy. Appropriate Community measures could prove very effective 
in this respect. 
II. CHANGES WITHIN THE INDUSTRY 
(i) Changes over the last few years 
17. In recent years a number of changes have taken place, with regard 
to the nature of demand, in the location of automobile production, 
the degree of interdependence between markets, the extent of 
concentration and cooperation, technological changes, rises in 
the price of energy, increased emphasis on safety and on the 
environment and on improving working conditions, and the increased 
role of governments. These changes need to be briefly recalled. 
18. For a long period there was rapid growth within the industry, 
based on a very rapidly rising level of demand. As the 
percentage of households owning cars has risen the nature of 
the demand has changed increasingly from first time purchasing 
to replacement purchasing. This trend is already well advanced 
within the Community where in 1978 there were almost 300 cars per 
1000 inhabitants though not as far as in the United States where 
a level of over 500 cars per 1000 inhabitants has been reached. 
19. This trend has several consequences. Firstly, the rate of 
growth is less dynamic in a replacement market than in a market 
characterised by first time purchasers. Secondly, it is more 
responsive to cyclical factors in that households are more likely 
to defer replacement purchases during periods of economic 
slowdown or recession. Finally, rather than all car producers 
sharing, if unequally, in a rapid increase in the volume of sales, 
the struggle for market shares becomes more important as an 
individual car producer's success depends more and more on making 
'conquest sales· from rival producers. 
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20. While the structural change in the nature of demand is evident 
within all developed countries' economies, it is leas clear 
When and if a point of 'saturation' will be reached When all 
households Who want a car or a certain number of cars will 
actually have them. The effects described in the paragraph 
above would clearly be accentuated if such a point was reached. 
There is currently considerable speculation and differences of 
opinion on When this point will be reached, at least in the 
market for private vehicles. The concept of 'saturation' 
has less validity, however, in the market for canmercial vehicles. 
21. It is arqued by some that there is still considerable scope for 
an increase in the percentage of Community households owning 
a car. It is also, however, evident that the number of cars per 
1000 inhabitants within the C~ity is unlikely to reach the 
level attained in the United States, Canada or Australia, for 
reasons of sheer physical space. For similar reasons the level 
of car ownership is anticipated to remain at a lower level 
within Japan than in the Community. 
22. It is theoretically possible that the market for private vehicles 
could grow exponentially in that households may want to go on 
purchasing more and more additional cars. The trend 
towards households owning more than one car is likely to 
continue~ but limits will be reached. Without entering into 
too abstract an argument, it ie likely that a point will be r•checl 
when moat families will have the number of cars they want and whun 
strains on the family budget, due not just to the coat of purcbaH 
but also to taxation, running costs, the cost of maintenance, the 
price of petrol and the diseconanies of car ownership such as ewer-
crowding of the roads, parking problems etc., will cause such U.111its 
to be reached. 
23. The market for commercial vehicles is of a different nature, 
though same of the diseconomies mentioned above will also apply. 
Government policy towards competing transport aystems will also 
be decisive. The rate of growth in demand, however, is likely 
to decline as well. 
24. The nature then of the automobile market within the community 
is changing and adapta~iona to a slower rate of growth will 
have to be made. Nevertheless, it is worth putting overly 
pessimistic forecasts into perspective: demand will continue 
to grow and technological change, for instance in dramatically 
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improving energy conservation, could make a replacement market 
a more vigorous one than expected, with old models becoming 
obsolete much more rapidly than before. It is also worth recording 
that demand in the sector eventually recovered more strongly from 
the 1973 oil shock.than many had anticipated. 
25. Finally, the rate of growth in the market will be different in 
different parts of the Community. In particular, enlargement will 
bring into the Community countries Where far fewer households have 
cars and where the potential for growth is far greater. This is 
even ~re the case in many developing countries and increased 
emphasis will have to be put on meeting demand in these new markets. 
26. The last few years have seen major changes in the structure of the 
industry itself, in terms of the very differing performance of the 
older producers and the rise of new products, the increasingly 
global character of the industry, the increasing degree of 
concentration and spread of cooperation agreements and to a lesser 
extent. growing diversification into other sectors. 
27. Now, as before, the bulk of world automobile production takes place 
within the Community, in the United States and in Japan. but the 
fortunes of the three major producing areas have varied greatly. 
The American industry was particularly badly hit by the 1973 oil 
crisis for Which it was the least well equipped to face in terms 
of its existing range of models. It is now having to invest 
massive sums to restructure itself and to 'down-size' the cars 
that it produces. The Japanese industry has expanded extremely 
rapidly, and in commercial vehicles is now the largest producer. 
Its rate of growth of production has increasingly outstripped the 
potential of its domestic market and it has become an increasingly 
major exporter. The Community industry has, in general, performed 
strongly but this hides great differences between the performance 
of the different community countries, with a general strengthening 
of the position of German and French producers and a weakening of 
the Italian and, in particular, United Kingdom producers. Part of the 
blame here obviously lies with individual companies that have failed 
to modernize. 
28. Production in other regions has developed considerajJly. 
Spanish production capacity has greatly increased, as has that of 
the Eastern European countries. Certain developing countries such 
as Brazil, Mexico and South Korea, are creating the nucleus for 
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what could well be major industries of the future, though estimates 
differ as to the degree to which they will rapidly became major 
competitors. 
29. The above changes have to be seen in the context of the increasingly 
global character of the automobile industry, and the increasing 
inter-penetration of the major producing firms. American firms 
were the first to establish overseas production capacity on a large 
scale when they moved into the European market to the extent that 
in a certain sense their European subsidiaries became the first truly 
'European' car firms. As the need to manufacture within the major 
markets rather than merely export to them has become more apparent, 
European firms have started producing in the United States, J3panese 
firms are beginning to find partners within Europe, and European, 
Japanese and Am~rican firms have established many more operations 
in developing countries. 
30. The reasons for these moves are varied, ranging from a search for 
a cheaper manufacturing base to the need to protect a manufacturer's 
position in a market around which new barriers are being created. 
It is important to point out, however, that dispersion of 
'production' can cover many different things ranginq from the 
manufacture of components through the assembly of cars in knocked-
down or semi knocked-down forms to full scale production, not to 
mention the main centres where design decisions are made. 
31. The implications of these different forms of dispersioa of activity 
vary greatly but one thing is clear, that automobile firms' 
activities are being spread over an increasing number of countries, 
in terms of sourcing of components, of assembly and of_production 
itself. 
32. This process of internationalization is well illustrated by the 
development of the so-called 'world car' Which has been defined as 
a vehicle with the 'same basic design and as many common or inter-
changeable parts as possible, and which will compete successfully 
in the world's major automotive markets, modified and tuned 
to their particular requirements'. 1 Indeed, it might well be 
more accurate to talk instead of 'world components' . 
1 Mr A. Cunningham, Vice-President for General Motors Overseas 
Operations, quoted in Financial Times survey on the 'European 
Motor Industry' (8 October 19_79) 
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33. The process of concentration has also somewhat intensified 
over the last few years, particularly in the Community car 
industry. This has been marked in a number of countries 
such as the United Xingdom with British Leyland, in Italy with 
Fiat, in Germany with Volkswagen and perhaps, moat strikingly, ir 
France with Peugeot/Citro•n/Talbot. 
34. It is worth noting, however, that with a few exceptions such as 
Iveco, the process of concentration has been primarily national in 
scope and successful transnational mergers have been rare. 
35. More striking, perhaps, has been the development of cooperation 
agreements and joint ventures of various types, for instance for 
the manufacture of engines and other components. 
36. Finally, there has also been a certain amount of diversification 
of automobile companies' activities into other industrial sectors. 
Links with the increasingly related electronics industry are one 
area Where this process is likely to develop (Volkswagen). 
37. The most striking change in recent years affecting the Community 
automobile industry has been the rise in the price of oil from 
1973·onwards, and its subsequent impact on the economy. The 
automobile industry was clearly hurt both directly and indirectly 
and there was a sharp cut-back in demand. Passenger car output 
subsequently fell from 11.5 million units in 1973 to 9.9 million 
in 1974 to 9.3 million in 1975. The resilience of the industry 
was 'Wll demonstrated by the recovery that followed and car 
output had again risen to 11.2 million units in 1977. 1979 was a 
record year for passenger car demand in Western Europe and 
commercial vehicle output, which had suffered less, also expanded 
rapidly. 
38. Nevertheless, in spite of the recovery, the energy crisis has led 
to a .fundamental structural shift and to a much greater emphasis 
on energy conservation. The need was especially marked in the 
United States, Where mandatory energy conservation targets were 
established, 1 but is vital among manufacturers everywhere. So far, 
1 In 1977 regulations were imposed that average petrol consumpti~n 
for all the cars made by each manufacturer would have to be at 
least 18 miles per gallon, and would have to reach a figure of 
27.5 miles per gallon by 1985. Heavy fines would be imposed in 
cases of failure to comply. 
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however, the only approach adopted within the Community has been one 
of voluntary commitments by manufacturers. 
39. Another important development affecting the automobile industry, 
though less suddenly than the energy crisis, has been the increas$d 
level of public interest in questions of safety and environ-
mental pollution. Particularly in the latter field, there has 
been greater regulatory emphasis in the' united States and Japan 
than in the Community. The early and mid 1970's saw particular 
concern in this area 1 • It has been estimated that in Japan 
around 40% of total ~esearch and development undertaken by Japanese 
car producers has been absorbed by expenditure for emission control 
devices 2 • 
40. More recently, however, as the economic slowdown has intensified, 
there has been increasing concern about the costs of the· strict new 
controls in these areas and the possible conflicts with other funda-
mental objectives such as energy conservation (certain emission 
control devices add considerably to the weight of a car and 
increase fuel consumption) • 
41. However, While there is agreement that an adverse impact on coats 
exists there has been little agreement on how much. It is 
interesting to note that 'a recent study prepared by the u.s. 
Environmental Protection Agency indicates that to meet the emission 
standards set by the Clean Air Act of 1970 •••• a retail price 
increase of up to $275 is necessary per car. The a~tomakers, on 
the other hand, indicate the jump will _be $400 to $500 per car' • 
('Automotive Industries- 11 June, 1977, page 21, quoted in 
Interfutures project') 
1 The United States has established specific targets for pollution 
control, for instance for the reduction of carbon monoxide and 
nitrogen oxide levels, and catalytic converters have had to be 
added to cars to meet the new targets. Japan adopted rigorous 
new emission control standards in 1978 with emission of 
nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbons by new passenger car models 
not being permitted to be higher than 0.25 per km. after 
April 1978, and with upper limits for the emission of carbon 
monoxide set at 2.10 g/km. 
2 Interfutures research project - phase c 'Long term perspective 
of the world car industries' February 1978, page 2. 
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42. While no major changes in production technology have appeared to 
revolutionize the industry in the last few years, the increased 
impact of automation has been considerable, such as the use of 
'robots' or 'programmable controllers', particularly marked 
within Japanese industries but also increasingly widespread in 
Community firms,including Fiat and British Leyland. 
43. The implications of increased automation for levels of employment 
and working conditions are still not at all clear and are going 
to be of vital importance. 
44. The automation just referred to will adversely affect the immediate 
employment situation, but will also have beneficial effects. While 
the employment effects give rise to concern, productivity levels 
will increase considerably. A further impact, is that it will also 
respond to employee demands for an improvement in the workinq 
environment,wit:h a reduction in a number of unattractive jobs. 
45. Concern about the nature of the working environment has developed 
considerably in the last few years. The problems in this area 
are reflected in particular by the high levels of absenteeism 
characteristic of the automobile industry in certain Community 
countries. 
46. A few innovative attempts have been made to improve the quality 
of the working environment, the most well-known example being 
the production line experiment at Volvo. This has not been 
widely copied, however. 
47. More recently, emphasis has been placed more directly on job-
creation measures, such as shortening the working week. The 
impacts that such measures might have on productivity and the 
trade-offs that might be needed are currently the subject of 
much controversy. 
48. Another important trend has been the increased role of governments, 
often involving a departure from fundamental policy. ~1e automobile 
industry is so important, and the employment consequences so major, 
that governments have beeninducedto play a greater role in 
encouraging mergers, in providing finance and incentives for new 
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investment and. in helplng to ba~l out companies 
which have got into trouble such as Chrysler in the 
United King1om and in the United States, and Volvo in the 
Netherlands. 
(ii) Recent changes 
49. After a strong recovery after the difficult period of 1974-75, 
the industry has again entered a period of crisis which has again 
made it the focus of attention. The effects have been particularly 
strong in the United States, but have also left their mark within 
the Community. There has been a considerable decline in the 
volume of sales and it is anticipated that new registrations of 
cars in Western Europe may fall by around six to eight per cent. 
The impacts on employmen~ have been very variable but job losses, 
particularly temporary lay-offs of uncertain duration, have been 
considerable. In Italy, in particular, the difficulties at Fiat 
have led to considerable tension. 
SO. The economic slow-down has clearly been greatly accentuated by 
the rapid rise in oil prices, What is becoming known as the 
'second oil shock•,and this has clearly had a particularly marked 
effect on the automobile industry. 
51. It is this generally poor situation which has accentuated concern 
about the rapid rise of market penetration by Japanese 
manufacturers which has been the most striking feature of recent 
months. Japanese manufacturers' share of the Community market 
has been rising steadily since the early 1970's (e.g. in the 
United Kingdom from 4.8% in 1973 to 10.4% in 1979, in the 
Netherlands from 11.4% to 18.9%, in Belgium/Luxembourg from 
12.5% in 1973 to 18% in 197~. However, this has accelerated 
greatly in recent months so that by July/August 1980 Japanese 
import penetration had risen from 10.4% to 19.7% in the United 
Kingdom (though it has since fallen back), from 18.9% to 31% in 
the Netherlands and from iB% to 29.2% in Belgium/Luxembourg. In 
France's more restricted market, penetration over the same period 
had risen from 2% to over 4% and in Germany's open market from 
5.4% to 13.1%: the Japanese share of the German market had been 
under 2% as recently as 1977. 
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52. The implications of this increase in penetration at a moment of 
cycl1cal slow-down are clearly severe. With respect to employment, 
' for instance, one of the witnesses at the hearing organised by the 
Committee on External Economic Relations 1 astimated that the 
potential loss of jobs within Europe as a Whole attributable to the 
Japanese advance might be of the order of 30-35,000 jobs. 
III. PROBLEMS CURRENTLY FACING THE EUROPEAN CAR INDUSTRY 
53. A common theme in certain discussions on the state of the 
Community automobile industry is whether there is a cyclical or 
structural crisis. Without getting involved in what is ultimately 
a sterile argument, it is clear that the cyclical'downturn 
combined with an intensifying competitive threat from other 
manufacturing countries, notably the Japanese, have put the spot-
light on certain structural weaknesses within the community 
automobile industry. 
54. Before examining these weaknesses, however, a number of qualifying 
comments need to be made. Firstly, it should be pointed out that 
the Community automobile industry retains a number of very 
considerable strengths. Its engineering skills (e.g. the develop-
ment of front-wheel drive) are still outstanding, consistent with 
the often more demanding conditions on European than on American 
or Japanese roads. In terms of cars designed to meet current 
market conditions, in particular with regard to fuel consumption, 
European. cars have had a marked advantage over American cars and, 
although complacency should be quarded against, they still appear 
to have a lead in quality over most Japanese cars. 
55. A second qualifying comment concerns the very great differences 
between the situations of the different manufacturers within the 
Community. As a general comment, the weaker CoiiiiiUnity economies, 
Italy and the United Kingdom, have had the weakest car industries 
as well, where levels of growth and of productivity have lagged 
behind or even declined. Even within these countries the position 
of different manufacturers has been uneven (Ford of Britain 
for instance, has done consistently better than British Leyland). 
1 
Miss Ouin (CCMC) 
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In Germany and France, however, the industry, at least until 
recently, has performed very well. 
56. Finally, pessimistic forecasts and projections of current trends, 
have to be examined very critically. As pointed out before, 
the severe situation of 1974 and 1975 was followed by a strong 
recovery and serious positions faced by industrial firms have 
been reversed, as was the case with Volkswagen in the early 1970's. 
Forecasts in studies carried out as recently as 1977 and 1978 are 
already outdated. The very rapid nature of change in this sector 
means that great caution is needed in examining the future. 
57. Nevertheless, certain common structural problems faced by the 
. Community automobile industry are apparent. One such problem is 
the fragmented nature of the European industry. There are 12 
main manufacturers and around 300 component manufacturers in 
Europe, for instance, compared with 3 major manufacturers and 30 
component manufacturers in the united States. Compared to the 
homogeneous Japanese (Where there is not even any foreign 
manufacturing presence) ·and American industries, the Community 
industry consists of a series of national industries with a major 
and sometimes dominant role in their own national markets, but 
far weaker in other·community countries. It is a commonly observed 
irony that the most 'European' vehicle firms are Ford and General 
Motors. 
58. With a few exceptions, such as that of Iveco, attempts at outright 
mergers over national boundaries have been thwarted or not been 
notably successful. (This has applied to the components area as 
well as to cars) 
59. There is considerable recent literature on required economies of 
scale in bulk vehicle manufacture. The CommUudon's recent paper 
cites a production level of 1 million cars per year as a 
' survival threshhold' and points out that only Peugeot, Volkswagen, 
Renault and Fiat surpass th~ level.1 The paper by Koopman 2 
stateE that 'it is widely accepted that the volume car producers 
should have an annual output of at least 2 million units split 
between a limited number of basic models in order to utilize 
1 Op. Cit. page 12 
2 Op. Cit. page 42 
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economies of scale to a full extent' • Whatever minimum and 
optimal levels are actually required in differing circumstances,, 
it is clear that certain economies of scale are indeed crucial. 
60. The costs of new technological developments, for instance of new com-
ponents, point out the need for scale and the importance of merger or 
cooperation. Development of a new engine may well cost about 
1 . $300 million and of a new gearbox $160 million • 
61. A second area of concern, at least with re~ard to Japanese 
industry, are the differences in levels of productivity. 
According to the study from the Commission itself, quoting vehicle 
manufacturers' figures 2 , Japan produced about 45 vehicles per 
employee in 1978 compared to a European average of 12 cars per 
employee (itself masking considerable differences in productivity 
within the Community). 
62. As the vehicle manufacturers in particular have pointed out, 
figures comparing productivity, and making a mechanistic 
comparison between number of car~ produced and numbers employed, 
should be treated with considerable caution. 'D'un pays a 
l'autre, d'une firme a l'autre, les programmes de production 
pr6sentent des structures tres differentes, notamment en ce qui 
concerne la plus ou moine grande int6gration de la fabrication 
des composants. Les produits realis6s sont 6galement difficilement 
comparables, depuis de petites voitures "populaires" jusqu'a de 
grosses voitures tres sophistiqu6es, et les •product mixc varient 
considerablement d'une firme a l'autre et, au sein d'une meme 
firme, d I une p6riode a 1' autre'' 3 o 
63. Nevertheless, it is clear that Japanese industry in particular has 
an exceptionally high level of productivity compared to its 
competitors, and that its incr~ase in productivity has been faster. 
Thi~ would appear to be due to a number of factors, to the 
Japanese industry being essentially one of assembly rather than 
manufacture w~th a heavy reliance on and coordinated relationship 
with the component manufacturers and with stock levels consequently 
being minimized, to a high level of automation and to a ncn~ilitant 
1 
2 
3 
Koopman Op. Cit. page 44 
Commission study Op. Cit. page 13 
'Commentaires de la Chambre Syndicale des constructeurs 
Francais d'Automobiles (CSCA) concernant l'avenir de 
l'industrie automobile Europ6enne' (page 3) 
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workforce working much longer hours (German working hours are 
about 20% shorter than in Japan) than those of its competitors and 
with lower rates of absenteeism. 
64. The competitive threat from Japan is of course not just due to 
productivity differences but to other factors as well, which have 
helped to push down the cost of their vehicles, including much 
lower (and not very transparent) wages paid by some of the 
component manufacturers, the much lower social costs paid by 
Japanese manufacturers and the undervalued yen. Yet, even if these 
other factors are given stronger emphasis (as did the European 
manufacturers' representatives in their evidence at the Economic and 
Monetary Affairs Committee's hearing on 20 October), it is still c~ 
that the Community industry has certain structural disadvantages 
compared to that of Japan. 
65. Much of the discussion at the Committee's hearing focussed on 
comparisons with Japan, which is the main cause of current concern. 
Nevertheless, a lot of vaguer concern has been expressed about the 
longer term competitive implications of the massive investment 
programme ($80 billion) currently underway in the United States. 
66. This raises questions about respective financial situations and 
future investment capacities. It would appear that the Community 
industry may have an overall weaker financial structure than that 
of its major competitors, in particular it is worth noting that 
levels of indebtedness are considerably higher than those of 
Japanese and American firms. 
67. Whether the community industry will be able to finance the needed 
investment and the role of national governments and Community 
institutions are key issues that need to be examined. In this context, 
a more substantial increase in risk capital is needed. 
68. The nature of the respective resources devoted to research and 
development are another important factor. Here the United States 
appears to have dedicated the largest amount of resources to 
automobile industry related research and development, and the level 
of government support has been higher as well. 
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69. Koopman's study 1 examined the differences between the situation in 
Germany and Japan. His study indicates that the share of intramural 
research and development expenditures in total sales of the German 
automobile industry declined from 3.4% in 1969 to 2.4% in 1977, and 
that the share of investment funds allocated for research and 
development purposes in total investment fell from 8.3% in 1971 to 
3.~ in 1977, thus falling behind the average for man~facturing in 
Germany. Employment in automobile R & D also ~ell. In contrast, 
the 'Japanese automobile manufacturers expanded both R & D 
expenditures and employment more rapidly than the industrial 
average' • 
70. While Koopman did not examine the situation i~ other countries in 
such detail he concluded that the German industry was probably 
devoting more resources to R & D, absolutely and relatively, than 
its major European competitors. His final conclusions were that 
'European automotive R & D needs a strong boost if a further erosion 
of market positions is to be avoided in the years ahead' • 
IV. KBY POLICY OPTIONS 
71. From the above analysis it is evident that the European automobile 
industry is in a much stronger position than certain other Community 
industries,but that. nevertheless. there are a number of problems 
that need to be tackled at European level. 
(i) Commercial policy 
72. The issues of most immediate topical concern are in the area of 
commercial policy. and more specifically What to do to face up to 
the immediate commerc~al challenge posed by Japan within the 
Community market. This is having severe consequences and safeguard 
measures of some kind are called for. 
73. Most of the speakers at the hearings organized by the Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Committee on External Economic 
Relations warned against the dangers of general protectionism not 
least because the Community is still a major exporter of vehicles 
as well as importer, though there were also certain calls for 
temporary import controls in order to buy a breathing space. 
1 . 
Op. Cit. pages 46-49 
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74. At present there is a common community tariff of 10.9% on cars and 
of 22% on trucks. Nevertheless, the approaches adopted by the 
different Member States in this area already vary considerably as a 
result of the absence of a true common commercial policy. The 
different national approaches range from the formal 
quota scheme agreed on between Italy and Japan whereby only 2,200 
Japanese cars a year can enter the Italian market, to the restrictive 
approach of France and the 'gentleman's agreement' between the 
British and the Japanese, to the hitherto unrestricted access 
permitted by Germany. One of the problems in coming up with a 
Community-wide approach, which would be more effective and would 
guarantee mare negotiating muscle, will be to face up to these very 
different approaches. 
75. Taking an overall Community view, the preferable course of action 
would be self-limitation on the part of Japanese exporters to the 
Community market as a whole. Furthermore, formal contacts between 
the European and Japanese manufacturers' associations can play a 
positive role in helping to achieve such a limitation. Communitv 
negotiators should also seek greater restraints from the Japanese. 
~t present, however, the longer-term effectiveness of the self 
limitation approach must be open to question: if positive results 
are not achieved, appropriate temporary decisions must be taken at 
Community level to face up to this situation in an effective way. 
76. What then are the possible alternatives to a voluntary self-
limitation on the part of the Japanese? In this regard, Community 
instruments have been proposed or already exist that could be 
invoked if necessary. 
77. One such instrument that has been proposed is the Commission's draft 
directive on a special Community certification procedure for 
industrial products originating in third countries, which has not 
yet been adopted by the Council. If adopte~ this could provide a 
useful tool in negotiations conducted by the Community aimed at 
opening up the Japanese market through the removal of administrative 
and other barriers to trade still existing in Japan. In this 
context, it is worth noting that the current imbalance between 
Japanese vehicle exports to the Community and Community vehicle 
exports to Japan is enormous (on the level of 50 to 1 and could be 
as great as 80 to 1 this year) • Even given the different size and 
nature of the two markets, a far better balance is needed. 
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78. A further and actually existing Community instrument is Council 
Regulation 926/79 Which contains two relevant sets of articles, 
Article 7 Which permits the installation of Community surveillance 
When imports from a third country threaten Community producers, 
and Articles 12 to 15 which give the possibility of invoking safe-
guard clauses, including a Community quota. 
79. Given the current impacts within the Community it may well be 
appropriate for some form of Community surveillance to be adopted, 
Whether ·•post' Community surveillance or the more rigorous 'prior' 
Community surveillance Which requires the production of an import 
document 1 Finally, if all else fails, the safeguard articles 
12 to 15 of EEC Regulation 926/79 might be invoked, though the 
overall GATT implications need to be assessed. 
80. Imports from other countries currently pose far lesser problems. 
There may eventually be severe competition from the United States 
and from the new developing country producers but the measures 
that need to be taken at community level are not at present 
primarily of a commercial nature, but more of a structural nature. 
The issue of imports from Spain and from Eastern Europe, however, 
need to be briefly mentioned. 
81. While the camaon customs levy on cars is established at 10. 9% 
Spain has a preferential access to the Community market. The 
applicable customs duty is only 4.3%. In recent years Spanish car 
production has expanded rapidly, and extra-community producers ha,,e 
established themselves str9ngly. The trade agreement of 1970 
between Spain and the Community has led to Spain having much readier 
access to the Community market, While Community producers have 
often found it difficult to enter the still heavily protected 
Spanish market. The current pattern of trade needs to be 
placed on an.equitable basis. Furthermore, the implications of 
Spanish entry into the Community for both the Spanish and Community 
car industries as a Whole need to be carefully examined by the 
Commission. 
82. Concern about Eastern European exports is of a rather different 
nature, and primarily focusses on the lack of transparency of 
production coats, Which, When combined with the need for 
foreign exchange, leads at least to the possibility of dumping on 
1 
~ an import licence 
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the Community market. This issue needs to be monitored and, in 
particular, the implications of buy-back deals with Eastern Europ~an 
producers for the Community automobile industry need to be. fully 
taken into account. 
83. A final set of commercial policy issues concern the impacts of ~nward 
foreign investment and of investments by Community producers in 
third countries. 
84. Inward foreign investment, investment by non-community vehicle 
manufacturers within the Community is a long-established phenomenon, 
towards which a positive approach is needed. As an example of this, 
the major American firms are changing to manufacture within the 
Community rather than just covering the market by exports at a 
relatively early date. Recently, this trend has developed with 
aapanese producers beginning to ~et a toehold within the Community, 
through the agreements between British Leyland and Honda, between 
Alfa Romeo and Nissan, through the assembly plant for Hino trucks 
in Ireland, and through possible involvement in the Spanish market. 
Such a trend has highly positive aspects, notably the creation of 
new jobs and possibly an infusion of new techniques and ideas and 
it is certainly preferable to the market beinq covered by imports, 
but it can also have negative effects, such as an increase in 
technological dependence. 
85. An even more controversial phenomenon is outward investment by 
Community produce~•· This has developed strikingly in recent year, 
in developing countries such as Brazil, Where the outp~t of firms 
such as Fiat and Volkswagen has reached a level of almost one quarter 
of home output, and in the United States where Volkswagen was the 
major pioneer but Where other European firms are following. It is 
still notably absent in Japan. 
86. The possible motives for foreign investment are very numerous, 
ranging from a need to create or maintain a producer's position in a 
foreign market wh~ch may be exceptionally large (such as the United 
States) or may be increasingly surrounded by barriers to imports 
(such as many rapidly growing developing countries), to seeking a 
lower cost manufacturing base in order to export worldwide, and so 
on. The greatest literature on the subject is in the United States 
Where there have been lengthy arguments as to the balance of 
benefits and of costs of such foreign investment, such as Whether 
. . 
there is a straight diaplace~nt of jobs at home and the overall 
1" 
_____________ impact on exports and imports • 
1 'American Multinationals and American Interests' by Bergsten, 
Horst, Moran, which concludes that, given the complex and 
contradictory evidence, a policy of neutrality, neither 
restricting nor subsidizing foreign investr~nt, is preferable. 
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87. It is evident that no easy generalizations can b~ made on issues of 
inward and outward investment. Each case must be judged on its 
merits, the terms of such investmen1: being vital such as, fer 
instanc~the ext~nt of local content provisions. Community 
monitoring, however, of the overall impacts of such investment wuuld 
be desirable. 
(ii) Achievement of a true Community market 
88. If certain problems of commercial policy call fer i~.ediate action, 
it is clear that a whole range of other actions will also be needed 
to achieve the key goals of maintainins the competitivi1:y and 
increasing the productivity of the European automobile inaus~xy in 
the longer term. 
89. One of the first needs is for full advantage to be taken of the scale 
of the European market. A Community market in this area does not 
yet truly exist and efforts need to be made to harmonize relevant 
national regulations, including fiscal barriers in coordinating 
national aids, and in eliminating technical barriers to trade. 
90. In this latter field, considerable progress has been made. It is, 
however, important that the technical barriers directives dealing 
with motor vehicles which are still pendinq at Council level should 
be adopted, as should the proposal for a special Community certifica-
tion procedure for industrial products originating in third countries. 
It is worth noting that when these are adopted, a CODUDunity type 
approval certificate for motor vehicles would effectively exist. 
(iii) Industry structure 
91. Excessive fragmentation has been identified as one of the major 
potential disadvantages for the Community in facing up to its 
competitors. Measures should be taken to encourage greater coopera-
tion between firms in the future, for instance, in the forms of 
joint programmes of non-competitive research, joint production 
ventures for costly components and other forms of cooperation. 
92. Formal mergers, particularly carried out over national boundaries, 
can often present considerable problems, and these disadvantages as 
well as advantages are becoming more apparent. (In this context it 
is interesting to note a shift of emphasis in Community policy away 
from the promotion of 'European champions'). Nevertheless, concentra-
tions should be encouraged where clearly appropriate, as in certain are~s 
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' of the components industry. In this context community competition 
policy might well be interpreted not simply within an intra-
community context but also in terms of the need to compete 
effectively with extra-community producers. 
(iv) Research and development 
93. It is vital that research and development efforts within the 
Community do not fall behind those of its major competitors. In 
this context it is encouraging to note that there seems to be 
increased cooperation in this area among the major manufacturers, as 
illustrated by the recent research venture involving Fiat, British 
Leyland Peugeot, Renault, Volkswagen and Volvo. 
94. This is, however, where the Community can also play a key role by 
helping to ensure the coordination of national research efforts, as 
well as by providing direct support for programmes of non-competitive 
research. 
95. The greatest challenge is to improve energy conservation, through 
research into such fields as the use of alternative fuels (such as 
synthetic fuels), improving engines and gearboxes, reducing vehicl~ 
weight, improving aerodynamic qualities, and so on. 
96. One rapidly developing feature is the increased use of electronics 
in vehicles. This is one field where the Community must ensure 
that its current lag in the new electronics technologies behind the 
United States and Japan does not put it at a longer-term disadvantage. 
97. Further important research challenges lie in the promotion of 
greater vehicle safety, and in noise and emission control. Ano~her 
key area for research is into improved production techniques. 
(v) Regulations at Community level 
98. Energy conservation, safety and environmental protection must remain 
key public policy priorities. One key issue which needs, therefore, 
to be further examined is Whether there is a need for a continued 
essentially voluntary approach or for mandatory regulations to be 
established at Community level. The Community's major competitors, 
the United States and Japan, (as well as smaller competitors such 
as Sweden) have put more emphasis on a regulatory approach than have 
the countries of the Community. 
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99. Industry has arqued aqainst the establislun~nt._o_f mandatory: tarqets 
within the Community, and also that meetinq environmental targets 
in particular would result in increased costs that could not be 
borne at present. 
100. However, mandatory requlations, particularly in the current priority 
area of enerqy conservation, could be a valuable stimulus to 
substantial proqress in these areas, and could help to improve 
competitivity in the lonqer term, particularly in competing within 
markets Where more riqorous standards have been imposed. Entering 
the Japanese market, for instance, already a difficult task, would 
be even more difficult if Japanese emission standards were not met. 
101. What is certain, however, is that if regulationswereestablished 
they should be at Community and not individual national level, Which 
would lead to the creation of more internal barriers. 
102. The objectives of improvinq enerqy saving, safety and pollution 
control may not always be strictly compatible both between themselves 
(e.g. emission control standards leadinq to increased enerqy 
consumption) and ~tween them and increased productivity cost 
reduction objectives. 
103. The above problems would appear to be a priority area for study and 
for measures: the Parliament therefore calls for a Commission study 
into the various implications of establishing regulations at 
Community level, on the nature of some of the costs that are entailed, 
on the impacts on shorter and lonqer-term competitivity and on the 
trade-offs that may have to be made. 
(vi) Social aspects 
104. There will clearly be major social repercussions as a result of 
forthcominq chanqes within the European automobile industry. It 
will therefore be necessary to take accompanyinq measures to cope 
with the adverse effects. In this field the Community should play 
a major role. 
105. It shoul.d take the lead in examin.inq the impacts on levels of 
employment and on workinq conditions of technological and of other 
chanqes within the industry. The implications of increased 
automation should be qiven particular priority. 
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106. Moreover, it will be essential to give prominence to Community 
vocational training programmes and to adopt suitable measures to 
finance them, in particular via the European Social Fund, as well as 
other measures aimed at improving job mobility. 
107. It will also be important to ensure that the trade unions and the entire 
workforce are kept adequately informed at an early stage and that the 
social partners should be encouraged to work together in developing 
appropriate policies. Guidelines concerning the reorganization of 
working time should be adopted. 
108. The regional impacts need to be carefully monitored and measures 
taken so that the localities most affected by forthcoming changes 
are not too seriously harmed and so that regional disequilibria 
within the community ... not accentuated. 
109. Finally, transport policy considerations should also be taken into 
account. One area where action is needed is the development of a more 
modern and effective public transport policy which could, for instance, 
help to improve traffic flows, reduce energy consumption and improve 
public transport facilities. 
- 33 - PE 68. 264/fin. 
MOTION POR A RESOLUTION (Doc. 1-280/80) 
tabled by Mr Sergio PININPARINA 
pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure 
on a European policy for the motor industry 
the European Parliament, 
- whereas the present situation and the short and medium term prospects 
for th6 European motor industry are particularly serieua and worrying, 
.• . RE!i:linds the Commbsu.on and the Council o.f Ministers of the European 
Communities in so far as they are competent of the need for planned 
action to tackle tt.a problems fac1n9 this 1nduet:.:-y Oll a general 
basis and thus enable Earopean fix~s to survive ~his difficult 
period and then to n~et the ever-increasing competition from 
outside the Communi~y eftectively~ 
2. Regards the energy crisis not as the only but certainly the basic 
cause of the increased difficulties faced by thj.s industry. 
'the most obvious cout:equ~nces incluile: 
- the growing dependence of the USA on expensive and uncertain 
imports of oilwhich has led to new attitudes and legislation aimed 
Jt reducing energy consumption and hence encouraged ~rican 
manufacturers to think in terms of cars of the saae size and 
specification as those made in Europe~ 
- the problem of energy saving and stricter ant.i-pollution rules which 
have also forced manufacturers to develop new teChnologies 
requiring investment on a scale more co&npatible with the size 
of industry to be found in the USA and Japan than in the 
Community; 
- the different ways in which the national economies have reacted 
to the rapid and exceptional rise in oil prices·vhich heve led to 
divergencies in the rate of increase of real disposable incomes 
which have in turn seriously affected the relative sizes of the 
various national markets in Europe; 
3. Underlines its concern at the strong American and Japanese challenge 
whiCh has now emerged and which tl'le European induatry is not at 
present in the best condition to meet effectively; 
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4. Points out in connection with this dual Challenge that: 
- ~~!-!!!~!~!~_!g~~!~!I is preparing to attack the world market 
and the European market in particular from a position of 
strength by 1981 using the results of major investment 
programmes geared to 'down-~izing'. These involve engine 
design, the choice of materials and the use of eleetrenics 
all in accordance with a plan to switch to cars of a 
~opean t~. 
Investments in this field are enormous: between $ 70 and 
80,000 million over the period 1979-1985. GM alone spends 
$ 5 to 7,000 million on investment each year. 
Implementation of these programmes benefits from a combination 
of factors: sustained Government support for research 
activities and a greater degree of productive mobility and 
flexibility resulting from the industrial relations climate 
and cooperation between employers and workers which allows 
firms to manaqe even major crises without too much drama: 
- as far as ~!-~!2!~!!!_!~~2!~ is concerned it is sufficient 
to consider the main features of its extraordinary growth. 
By 1979 production, which had begun in the 1960s, exceeded 
6 million units, half of which were exported, and according 
to realistic forecasts - based on the level of investments 
made - it is likely to reach the 12 million mark by 1985. 
It is also impressive to note that in the five year period 
1973-1978 production of cars has increased by 3~ in Japan 
and 8% in Germany while .it fell by 19% in Italy and 39% in 
the-United Kingdom. Over the same period Japanese exports 
rose by 113%, French exports by 17%whereas Germany exported 
8%, Italy 1.2% and the united Kingdom 31% fewer.cars. This 
explains why the Japanese industry's share of the European 
market grew from 0.5% to 7% in·the 1970s despite the strict 
quotas imposed by some countries. 
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The Japanese industry was able to achi~v• this perferaance 
because of its outstanding level of prpd~ctivity. The 
leading Japanese manufacturer produced 42.8 cars per 
worker in 1978, the leading Geraan manufacturer 13.6 and 
the leading Italian manufacturer 11.2. 
This situation can be explained by a nuaber of factors: 
- relating to the social climate and including (a) more 
stable industrial relations in tune with the demands 
of a modern industrial society, (b) workers' and 
trade unions• attitudes in tune with the specific 
nature of this type of indutry and receptive .to 
the idea that the interests of the fira and of its 
workers are identical: 
- relating to structural aspects and including (a) large-
scale manufacturers a~le to obtain major economies of 
scale from the standardisation of coaponents, (b) lower 
unit costs, greater flexibility in deploy.ent of the 
workforce, a high degree of mobility and average 
working hours much higher than in Europe (e.g. Japan 
2,200/2,400 hours, Italy 1,500 hours a year). 
5. Points out that faced with this external c0111petition the comaunity 
car industry is structurally weak becauae it is split up into an 
excessively large number of producers in c~rison with the 
overall level of production. 
Ten European manufacturers account for 27.~ of world production 
or 8.8 million units compared with GM which has a share of 22.6% 
or 7.2 million units. 
The two major European grou~s (PSA and VW)account for less than 
30% of European production whereas GM and Ford in the USA and 
Toyata and Nissan in Japan account for about 75% of their national 
markets. 
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There is not then a European automobile i~dustry as such but a 
series of national industriea, each of which tends to dominate its 0~1 
internal market, as is confirmed by the fnllowing figures: 
(a) VW 31% of the German market 
(b) Fiat 56% of the Italian market 
(c) Renault 33% of the French market. 
These structural defects make it inevitable that furt~~her weakne~ses 
will develop in the face of world competition; 
- because of the splitting up of production facilities and the limited 
scale of production, it becomes more difficult to achieve economies 
of scale and to introduce autoaation, make innovations and achieve 
technological independence and the possibilities of standardizing 
components are reduced: 
the 'national' objectives of the various automobile companies lead 
to a tendency to diversify their product which nlakes it more 
expensive to cover individual national markets: 
6. Deplores the particularly worrying fact that the net result of this 
situation is that - in an energy crisis Which is weakening the 
automobile industry throuqhout the world - it is the :suropean 
industry Which is suffering instead of settinq the pace in 
competition. 
At the present tt.a the industries in the USA and Japan appear 
more readily able to convert rapidly to the technoloqical 
requirements of the European market, While the industry in 
Europe is slow to rationalize althouqh it has always offered 
for sale on aarkets outside the Community products with a lower 
energy consumptionr 
7. Believes tha~ in spite of all these difficulties, protectionism 
is not the way of dealing with external competition but also 
believea that it would b~ fatal to the Community's automobile 
industry to face up to'this challenge unprepared and th~t 
at least until the first effects of coordinated measures by the 
Community begin to be felt it is necessary to take a number of 
temporary safequard measures to protect the competitive position 
of the industry in Europe: 
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The European ?arliament therefore: 
s. Requests the CommiPsion and Council to lay aown a series of measuree 
for action and coordination in the commun1tt automobile industry 
making planned use of the existing legal instruments and directed 
towards a two-fold strategy: 
(a) Externally, to rcroove the structural causes for Europe's 
interiority compared with the US and ,Japanese industries: 
(b) Internally, carrying out a general rationalization of the industry, 
ensuring that it does not weaken but rather strengthens the 
flexibility of decision-making and operation of companies. 
These objectives can be achieved in three ways: 
unification of market conditions 
unification of the conditions of operation of companies by 
harmonizing national legislation on industry 
coordination of national public aids in this sector: 
9. Stresses in particular two fundamental priorities 
(A) granting incentives to the automobile companies' European 
research programmes on fuel consumption, emissions, safety, 
new technologies and alternative energy systems: 
(B) encouraging concentrations in the components sector to be 
implemented through a European industrial policy operating 
independently of national government policies. 
As regards point (A) we mu&t take a positive attitude and see the 
recent agreement concluded by six European manufacturers as a 
move towards cooperation in this field, a starting point for 
the more intense efforts which will be achieved with the direct 
involvement of the Community institutions. 
As regards point (B) on the other hand, this is undoubtedly the 
most suitable short-term measure to enable the industry in Europe 
to achieve a competitive position with regard to non-Community 
manufacturers. It will indeed be possible in this way to achieve 
economies of scale while maintaining the specific identities of 
national products and the necessary decision-making and operational 
flexibility of individual companies. 
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One of the ways in which the Community should encourage this 
process of concentration is the cre•tion of new production plant 
for the manufacture of shared compo~ents. 
These plants should be sited in the depressed areas of the 
Community and granted financial aid to reduce installation costs. 
Because this type of production has a high added value in relation 
~o transport costs, it will also have a much wiaer available market 
than the finished product and will therefore be a better way of 
extending automobile construction processes to the poor areas of 
the Community without having recourse simply to forms of aid: 
10. Affirms the vital importance for the recovery of the automObile 
industry of the implP-mentation of a series of provisions and changes 
in legislation and in the policies of governments, employers and 
unions on industrial legislation in general. 
This applies in particular to: 
(a) the harmonization of laws on industrial relations: 
(b) the harmonization of the social security component of wage 
costs: 
(c) a uniform dE>!:inition of annual working hours and conditions 
governing overtime: 
(d) the concentration of incentives: 
(e) the monitoring o~ all measures Which might affect production 
costs in various fields: 
(f) the introduction of a fund for temporary lay-offs, and for 
vocational training to provide for smooth operation of 
restructuring processes in this sector; 
(g) the launching of major industrial projects in the automobile 
sector outside of Europe with a resumption of the activities 
of the European Ex-Import Bank; 
(h) the granting of incentives to exports outside the CoiiiiiUility. 
All these provisions are of a particularly urgent nature if, as 
the Commission pointed out recently, the industry in Europe is 
to maintain control over its own future and not be a mere link 
in a world strategy which is decided on elsewhere without its 
knowledge; 
11. Instructs its President to forward th·is resolution to the Council 
and Commission of the European Communities. 
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MOTION Fat A RESOLUTION (Doc. 1-311/80) 
tabled by Mr SARRE, Mrs CDRZAT, Mr MOTCHANE, AmtEX II 
Mr SCHWARTBNBERG, Mr OBIU.ER, Mr PETERS, Mr SUTRA, 
Mr SCBIELBR, Mr ROGERS, Mr FAURE, Mrs SALISCB, 
Mr JOSSBLIN, Mr VAN MIERT, Mr van MINNEN, Mr von der VRINQ 
Mr LOMAS, Mr BOYES, Mrs CLWYD, Mr ES~IER, Mr MOREAU, 
Mr PISANI, Mr BALFE, Mr JAOUBT, Mr GLINNE and Mrs ROUDY 
with request .for urgent debate pursuant 
the Rules of Procedure 
on the future of the car industry 
The European flrliament, 
to Rule 14 of 
- disturbed at the serious and mounting threats to the future of 
the community car industry, 
- anxious for production capacities and empl~ent levels in this 
sector to be maintained, 
- surprised at the unrestricted expansion of the tradinq activities 
of third countries, which are frequently akin to dumpinq and 
seriously disrupt the community car market, 
- conaiderinq, in particular, the deficit in the relevant trade 
balance with one third country, Japan, 
l. Rejects the comments made by the Ccallliaaion representative 
responsible for industry indicating a refusal to take the 
measures needed to aafequard the European car industry: 
2. Denounces this attitude, which constitutes a serious threat 
to ~ployment, at a, time when there are 110re than six 
million un~ployed in the community: 
3. Requests the commiaaion to sul::mit to the European Parliuent 
an urqent program:ae clesiqned to aafequard the ca.unity car 
industry and includinq the necessary com-ercial, indUstrial 
and social measures. 
4. Instructs ita President to forward this resolution to the 
Council and Commission. 
JUS'l'IPICATIOR 
The substantial imbalance in trade in the car sector is seriously 
undermininq employment in this sector. 'l'he stat.aent.a 11ac!e by the 
commission representative in Munich on 3 JUly call for t.aediate 
CClllllll&nt by the European Parliament. 
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OPiliTIOB 0P '1'BB COMMIT'l'BE ON BX'l'ERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
Draftsman: Mrs S. AGNELLI 
The cCIIDittee considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 
23 September, 1 October, 25/26 November and 2 December 1980, and adopted 
it at the latter meeting by 13 votes to 5 with one abstention. 
Present: Sir Frederick Catherwood, chairman: Mrs Wieczorek-Zeul, 
vice-chairman: Mr van Aerssen, vice-chairman: Mr Irmer, deputy draftsman: 
Mr BPJh, Mr De Keersmaeker (deputizing for Mr Jonker), Mr Deschamps, 
Mr Filippi, Mr GiUIIIIIarra, Mr Hl.nsch, Mr Lemmer, Mrs Lenz, Mrs L. Moreau, 
Mr Rord (deputizing for Mr Louwes), Lord O'Hagan, Mrs Pruvot (deputizing 
for Mr de Clercq), Mr Radoux, Mr Rieger (deputizing for Mr Seal}, 
Mr seeler, Mr Spicer, Sir John Stewart-Clark and Mr WelSh. 
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I. Possible initiatives by the European Parliament and the Commission 
1. In tackling the problems of the car industry, we should ask ourselves 
what role the European Parliament might legitimately be expected to play, 
what policies should be recommended to the Commission and What particular 
measures should be implemented by the Commission. The draftsman feels 
that it should be re-emphasized that it is not the role of the Commission 
to take over from individual companies the responsibility for taking the 
decisions required to adjust production to take account of the present 
state and the likely development of the industry. 
In conformity with the provisions of the Treaty, efforts must be made 
to identify those measures that would be most likely to help car manufac-
turers take full advantage of their position as part of a massive, integrated 
Community market (detailed figures are to be found in PE 67.008). The task 
of the Common Market must be to place manufacturers on an equal footing with 
their foreign competitors, so that they are in a position to resist competi-
tive pressures without having to resort to the sort of protectionist measures 
that would undermine the very nature of the Common Market. 
II. The development and structure of demand within the Community 
2. The ample information contained in the document to which we have 
just referred needs to be supplemented by an evaluation of the likely 
trends in demand for motor cars on the Community market and a breakdown 
of the various categories of vehicles available to meet that demand. In 
this connection, it should be pointed out that, notwithstanding a decline 
in overall growth, 'the European market will continue to be one of the main 
world markets, even though trends in and the structure of demand on that 
market do not reflect a uniform pattern in the various Member States. 
3. By way of illustration, during the period following the first oil 
crisis (1973), demand on the Italian car market increased at a slower 
rate than gross domestic product, in contrast to what happened in France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom. 
A further factor to be borne in mind is that the structure of demand 
differs from one Member State to another: the small or 'mini' cars 
(Fiat, Ford Fiesta, etc.) account for almost 50% of the total market in 
Italy and for about 35% in France, whereas in Germany and the United Kingdom 
the percentage is only about 15%. 
Despite the fact that in Italy the level of motorization is approaching 
that of the other Member States, the market share of the larger vehicles is 
only 20-25%, as against 50-60% in the United Kingdom and Germany: the main 
reasons for this are the differences in per capita income, the pattern of 
car purchases (first car, second car, replacement) and fiscal policy. 
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Since the Community market is highly integrated, the qualitative 
differences in the structure of demand mean that the choice of production 
ranges is dictated by the national market, which makes it particularly 
difficult for manufacturers such as Fiat that suffer from diseconomies of 
scale in producing and distributing cars in the up-market category, to 
maintain outpttt of a range of models suited to the wider 'European' market. 
In Europe, therefore, the lack of market homogeneity compared with 
the Japanese market, coupled with the need for economies of scale in 
production and distribution, tempts certain manufacturers to cater 
exclusively for the national market. 
III. The strategy of the Americans and the Japanese 
4. The development of the European car industry in the 1980s will largely 
be determined by the new policies now emerging in the USA and Japan, as 
well as by marketing trends in Eastern Europe and in some of the developing 
countries (KOrea and Brazil, for example). 
The draftsman considers it important to give a short preliminary account 
of the new 'American challenge' and of Japanese reactions to it, since, 
together with a further slump in economic growth and the continuation of the 
energy crisis, they will be the factors that will have the greatest influence 
on the European industry. 
First of all, what do we mean by the 'new American challenge'? 
General Motors, the world's largest car producer, decided at the end 
of the 1970s to switch from a policy of maintaining the company's share of 
the market and distributing profits in dividends to shareholders, to a more 
aggressive policy, albeit of an 'indirect' kind, based on the promotion of 
the USA's new energy policy (CAFE) and counting on the fact that Ford and, 
above all, Chrysler, would be faced with appreciable difficulties in the 
process of 'downsizing' their vehicles. 
The essence of the new American challenge, therefore, lies in the 
production of the small and much-publicized 'world' cars. This new 
aggressive approach is causing the US Government considerable embarrassment 
since, traditionally, it has pursued a policy of non-intervention in the 
industry, intervening only in its capacity as 'legislator' to enforce the 
relevant safety and anti-pollution regulations. Now, however, it finds that 
it is compelled to give financial assistance to Chrysler, while the FTC is 
trying to establish whether the success of GM is to be ascribed to its 
efficiency or, instead, to the exploitation of monopolistic privileges. 
- 43 - PE 68.264/fin. 
5. The new American strategy has triggered off a chain reaction on th~ 
part of competitors. The Japanese, in particular, are being forced to adopt 
a fundamentally different strategy. Contrary to what is commonly believed, 
the success of the Japanese in the 1970s was based on the perspicacious 
development of commercial and production strategies that fully exploited the 
country's particular socio-industrial structure. 
The growth of the national market (12% in the 1960s and 6% in the 1970s) 
was protected partly through the collaboration of the MITI, with the intro-
duction of safety and anti-pollution regulations that created 'concealed' 
barriers to imports (customs duties were abolished), and partly through a 
reduction in prices in real terms. 
In addition to achieving a strong position on her own market (50% of 
all sales), Japan evolved a shrewd export policy, aimed at the USA and at 
European· countries without a national automobile industry (Belgium, 
Switzerland, etc.), with a weak national industry (United Kingdom) or with 
an industry that enjoys less protection than most (Germany). 
This policy enabled Japanese manufacturers - and in particular Toyota 
and Nissan - to achieve very high output levels and, hence, economies of 
scale. A further factor has been the special structure of the Japanese 
industry which enjoys at one and the same time the advantages of integration 
and the advantages of dispersion (Toyota and Nissan have introduced a flexible 
salary structure and succeeded in standardizing components through the indirect 
control of a chain of large, medi~sized and small subsidiary suppliers). 
However, the Japanese industry is now under pressure. 
The national market is beginning to decline, with growth during the 
1980s being forecast·at 2%. In addition, there is the 'new' American 
challenge and pressures within the USA for tighter protectionist measures, 
the emergence in the developing countries of new competitors (the Koreans, 
for instance) and the pursuit within Europe of an increasingly tough policy 
of protectionism (quota restrictions in Italy, semi-official restrictions 
in France and the United Kingdom and threatening protests on the part of 
the Germans). 
The Japanese are reacting to these new pressures in the following 
way. In the USA the aim will probably be to build assembly plants locally 
and to penetrate new markets (prestige saloon cars and sports cars), which 
have traditionally been dominated by imports from Europe, While in Europe 
itself attempts are being made to circumvent protectionism via agreements 
with European manufacturers (Honda-BLMC, Alfa-Nissan, Toyota-Seat). 
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It will oe possible for this commercial strategy to be maintained if 
output can be kept at traditional levels through further reductions in 
costs, increased automation etc., which ought to enable the Japanese industry 
to reduce its break-even ~oint from 60% of use of capacity in the 1970s to 
40~ in the 1980s (c. f. developments iJl the Japanese iron and steel industry). 
IV. The strategy of the E~ropeans 
6. In this new competitive situation, the European manufacturers will be 
caught between two fires. The American challenge poses a threat both to 
European sales in the USA - in view of the current policy of 'downsizing' 
- and to the sales prospects of European manufacturers in Europe, with Ford 
and Opel competing for a lar~er share'of the market. 
At the same time, the Japanese represent a threat both in the USA -
with the possibility of Japanese assembly plants being built locally and 
a shift in Japanese interests towards traditionally European markets -
and in Europe where, by direct and indirect means, attempts are being 
made to secure an even larger share of the markets. 
It is difficult to hazard a guess as to which manufacturers will still 
be in business at the end of the 1980s~ It will perhaps be instructive to 
take a closer look at the strategies applied by the l~rger European producers 
like, for instance, Ford and General Motors. 
7. The European strategy of Ford and GM is a reflection of their interna-
tional strategy, but Ford has been more successful, having achieved a larger 
increase in its market share and bigger profits. Indeed, Ford has been a 
far more aggressive competitor than Opel (most of Ford's world profits derive 
from its European operations}, since it has pursued a production range policy 
that is at once aggressive (one h•s only to think of the success of the 
Fiesta, whereas Opel has not even· entere·d the small car sector} and rational 
(maximum standardization of engines, transmissions etc.) and is based on a 
far more 'European' and integrated production strategy than that pursued by 
Opel (Ford is an 'integrated' producer in Germany,·. the United Kingdom, Spain, 
etc., whereas Opel has not even succeeded in integrating Vauxhall. GM's 
new world strategy will, however, be an incentive to Opel to develop a more 
aggressive production range policy, to formulate more fully integrated produc-· 
tion policies and, above all, to increase its production capacity (factory 
in Spain capable of producing 300,000 vehicles). 
Ford will try to defend its interests without any great changes in 
strategy, while taking full advantage of i~s lead in the development of the 
'world car' (of which the recent Erika/Escort is a good example). 
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8. The takeover of Chrysler Europe (Talbot} gives the Peugeot-Citroen 
group the chance to become the leading European manufacturer. The group's 
strategy will be primarily based on the rationalization of the range for 
its three markets, which at present comprises some 30 different bodies and 
7 engines with transmissions and is thus preventing the group from taking 
full advantage of the possible economies of scale. In addition, the group 
will press on with the task of rationalizing components - which began with 
a view to national requirements.(Douvrin factory, with Renault}, but is now 
beginning to take on a European dimension {agreement with Fiat for the 
joint production of one million engines} - and its networks throughout 
France. 
During the 1970s Renault increased its share of the market by pursuing 
an aggressive production range policy (RS} and an aggressive product promotio1 
policy {LE CAR}, while maintaining a large number of bodies and 8 engines 
within its production range. 
The takeover of Talbot by Peugeot-Citroen created a threat for Renault, 
since it had now to face very strong domestic competition. Its response to 
this threat was to conclude agreements with Volvo ~nd American Motors, which 
is a clear indication that its strategy in the 1980s will be directed, not 
merely towards a rationalization of the basic range, but also towards a 
strengthening of the ~p-market range of vehicles (with the a~sistance of 
Volvo in Europe and of AMC in the USA). 
VW Audi 
9. The success of the new strategy adopted by VW Audi in the 1970s - as 
reflected in the group's superlative marketing and financial performance -
is attributable to an astute production range policy, which brought into 
being a whole series of new models (Golf, Polo, Audi 80, etc} and to the 
achievement of extraordinary economies of scale thanks to the standardization 
of the various models and the effective amalgamation of VW and Audi (using 
only three engines and the same floor pans/bodies}. Besides this successful 
production range policy, mention should also be made of the American venture 
with vw. 
In the 1980s VW Audi will probably endeavour to counter competitive 
pressures through a greater diversification of the Audi and VW ranges, 
investment in automation and a further expansion of activities outside 
Europe. 
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B~C 
10. BLMC continues to make_ headway with its restructuring programme thanks 
to a new production range policy, whose success can be judged by the appearance 
of the Mini Metro, the Bounty (jointly produced with Honda) and, before long, 
the new LClO. -~e restructuring programme is aimed at achieving greater 
competitiveness in terms of costs and is based on the elimination of a few 
models, the use of Japanese mechanical components for the Bounty and a high 
degree of automation for the production of the Metro. All this points to 
a cut-back in volume terms, as is attested by the loss of 18,500 jobs in 
1979, while a further 25,000 redundancies are expected over the next one or 
two years. 
Fiat 
11. In the 1970s Fiat had set itself a production target of 2 million 
vehicles - considered to be the minimum number that would guarantee survival 
- for its three markets, represented by Fiat, Lancia/Autobianchi and Seat 
respectively.· The present reduction in sales and the financial losses 
sustained by Fiat are attributable to the notoriously difficult industrial 
relations problems, as well as to the considerable diseconomies of scale 
resulting from the limited degree of standardization between the three 
markets, the smallness of the Italian market for vehicles in the up-market 
category and the extent. of the competition between 1973 and 1978 in market 
sectors of vital importance to Fiat (127 and 128). 
Fiat's new strategy envis~ges the restructuring of the range with 
four basic models, the elimination of the Seat and the negotiation of 
agreements for the development of quality cars and for the supply of 
components (e.g. an agreement with Peugeot for one million engines). 
On top of this, there are plans to scale down production and to lay off 
workers while this is in progress. 
The smaller manufacturers 
-------------------------
12. BMW, Mercedes, Alfa, Volvo, etc. cannot afford to ignore the radical 
changes now affecting the pattern of competition. For these 'specialized' 
producers the basic question is whether the large profit margins they 
enjoy thanks to the prestige factor are greater than the extra costs arising 
from the diseconomies of scale that a lower level of output inevitably 
entails. The German companies· (BMW and Mercedes) find themselves in a 
favourable position {as·is attested by their much-pUblicized share of the 
market and their substantial profits), owing to the size of the German 
market for their products and to large profit margins. 
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These two companies will be investing almost 7,000 million dollars 
on the extension of their range (the 'small' BMW 1300 and Mercedes 1700), 
as well as on promotional measures and the expanaion of capacity. 
13. unlike the German companiea, Volvo and Saab have found that profit 
margins have not been sufficient and are still not aufficient to offset 
the diseconomies of scale resulting from a small domeatic market. The 
two Swedish firma have tried to circumvent this difficulty by means of 
agreements with other European manufacturers for the supply of components 
(e.g. Douvrin and Volvo) and other agreements (Volvo-Renault and Saab-Lancia) 
that alone will ensure their survival in the 1980s. 
14. Alfa Romeo is trying to·offset the diseconomies of scale resulting from 
the smallness .of the Italian market for the high-performance cars for which 
it traditionally caters, with a new production range policy. It is also 
trying to 'fill up' the production capacity ~f the Alfasud factory through 
an agreement with Nissan. 
15. Finally, the new Innocenti, formerly a sUbsidiary of BLMC, has managed 
to survive thanks to an improvement in productivity and to the economies 
of scale made possible by the supply of BLMC engines and transmissions. 
16. To sum up, then, the European industry will be under considerable 
pressure during the 1980s, not merely because of a further slump in the 
growth of the market, but also and mainly because of new competitive 
pressures. 
As we have seen, the new strategies of the American and Japanese 
manufacturers have received the full support (albeit controversial in 
the case of Chrysler) of the~r respective 9overnments. 
On the other band, the European governments have developed policies 
for the motor car industry primarily with a view·to national requirements. 
The German Government, with its reluctance to adopt protectionist measures 
(one has only to think of the position established by the Americans and 
of the recent massive increases in the share of the market achieved by 
the Japanese), has nonetheless helped VW and BMW out of their occasional 
difficulties, although at present, with the industry in a strong and 
buoyant position, government assistance is restricted to the generous 
financing of research programmes. 
After attempting,in the 1970s, to encourage the formation of a national 
bloc centred on the Renault and the Peuqeot~Citroen-Talbot groups, the 
French Government recently authorized a greater degree of 'Europeanization' 
(Renault-Volvo, and the Peugeot-Fiat deal tor the supply of one million 
engines), while maintaining a tolerant, though potentially threatening, 
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attitude towards Japanese imports until their share of the French market 
eventually settled at around 3%. 
The objectives of the Italian Government have been the creation of 
new jobs in the south (especially via Alfa Romeo in which the State bas 
a holding) and the strict maintenance of quota restrictions (approximately 
2,000 vehicles a year) on imports of Japanese cars. Of ~ate, there seem 
to have been moves to revive the national industry, as evidenced by the 
approval given to the Alfa-Nissan agreement (which remains conditional 
upon the agreement's compatibility with Community and national objectives) 
and by the formulation of a sectoral plan. 
Finally, the traditional role of the British Government has been 
to intervene to rescue firms i~ difficulty, as well as to provide direct 
financial assistance to ·BLMc. In ~ecent years, and especially since the 
Ryder and CPRS plans, the government has supported the restructuring of 
the national car industry - and particularly BLMC - though this has meant 
sacrificing many jobs. By and large, the British Government has in the 
last few years adopted a moderately protectionist approach, forcing the 
Japanese voluntarily to restrict their imports to a level of about 11% 
of the national market, while at the same time authorizing the agreement 
between BLMC and Honda. 
In a word then, the attitudes of the European governments have 
largely been a reflection of national views, experiences and objectives. 
The German Government pursues a policy of virtual non-intervention, 
in view of the competitiveness of its domestic car industry~.tbe French 
Government bas endeavoured to strengthen the competitiveness of the 
French companies, initially with a view to national requirements and now. 
it would seem, with a view to the broader European interest1 the I~a~ian 
Government has devoted its enerqies to the protection of its nat~0~al 
industries as a source of new jobs~ the British Government, fcllowing 
a period of rescue operations, is supporting an expensive and painful 
process of restructuring. 
The Community, on the other hand, has played an altog~ther limited 
role and has unquestionably been more active in other sectors such as 
the iron and steel sector. 
v. Proposals 
17. The above survey raises many questions and since the answers to 
some have a bearing on the answers to. others, it is right to assume 
that we are dealing here with a matter in Which there are many 
imponderables and uncertainties. It would seem that one of the objectives 
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of Community action should be to reduce the area of uncertainty, and it 
is with this in mi~d that we would now venture to suggest a number of 
possible guidelines. 
First and foremost,. it seems obvious from the observations made 
above that the European car industry is now entering a period of profound 
and radical restructuring that could call both for a sizeable reduction 
in production capacity in order to eliminate uncompetitive structures and 
for the launching of new strategies. However, the Member States will not 
be required to act in an identical fashion, since it is apparent that 
there are marked and increasinq differences in the competitive capacity 
of the various national industries. 
18. In the management of. the restructuring programmes,· the Commission's 
functions might be to ensure that .the sacrifices that rationalization entails 
are spread fairly between the stronger and the weaker undertakings, to 
co~rdinate restructuring fChemes and to support these schemes with appro-
priate international"trading policies. 
The task of rationalizing the industry will require the introduction 
of a comprehensive employment policy ~hat will promote, as necessary, 
inter-sectoral mobility, while generally encouraging the mobility and 
retraining of the labour force. 
19. As part of the restructuring process, the search for 'European' 
economies of scale, especially as far as components are concerned, 
may call for the reorientation of industrial policies that are traditionally 
formulated with purely national requirements in mind (attenti.on is drawn in 
this connection to the Peugeot-Fiat agreement for the production of one 
million engines). If economic requirements are such as lo necessitate 
agreements and joint ventures of a transnational kind (BLMC-Honda. ~lfa­
Nissan}, and not solely of a European kind, the final terms mu~~ h1. ~l;!ft 
to the individual companies themselves to decide. 
20. Again as part of the necessary restructuring process, it is of 
fundamental importance to coordinate research in order to avoid 
imbalances, duplication and pointless competitive expenditure. This 
will mean orchestrating the provisions relating to incentives and monitoring 
their application via control of the competitive process. 
Research must be directed towards the attainment of well-defined 
European objectives relating to safety, anti-pollution measures, the 
reduction of fuel consumption, technological development models,etc. 
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21. Finally, the regulations and policies relating to trade, particularly 
with Japan, need to be more sophisticated than those that are based merely 
on protectionism and demands for the revaluation of the yen 1• 
The car industry is of such vital importance in world trade that any 
form of national protectionism could have very serious consequences. 
Moreover, a 'processing' industry like the Japanese industry would, in 
the long run, be severely handicapped by an artificially undervalued 
currency. However, Japanese manufacturers at present have the edge over 
their European competitors in view of: 
1. lower production costs resulting from lower social security charges 
and from a different approach to the organization of production, which 
is largely based on sub-contracting: 
2. the· 'competitive devaluation' policy .. pursued by the Japanese monetary 
authorities, as a result of which the value of the yen is at present 
20% be low its rea 1 value; 
3. the difficulty of balancing trade between the EEC and Japan by securing 
greater access for the European industry to the Japanese market, owing 
to the different structures and the smaller size of that market. 
As far as the first point is concerned, the Europeans simply have to 
accept the different socio-economic systetn of the Japanese as a fact of 
life, which they are in no position to alter. 
As for the undervaluation of the yen, which is tantamount to a tariff 
barrier in trade relations between Europe and Japan, it is up to the 
International Monetary Fund (of which Japan is a member) to ensure compliance 
with the monetary policy competition rules laid down by its regulations. 
Under the present conditions, apart from the restructuring measures 
we have mentioned for increasing the competitiveness of the European 
automobile industry, the best solution that can be suggested in the short 
term is voluntary restraint by the Japanese on their exports of cars to 
Europe, with a view to protecting mutual interests and in the knowledge 
that any further worsening of the crisis, with the dire consequences for 
the. economy and· empl~ment that must surely be expected, would leave the 
Community with no alternative but to introduce very tough protectionist 
measures. 
1 
In this connection, attention should be drawn to paragraph A of Article IV 
of the amended articles of the IMF Agreement, which reads: 'A member shall 
not manipulate the exchange rates or the international monetary system with 
a view to avoiding effective adjustments to its balance of payments or to 
securing an unfair competitive advantage in its dealings with the other 
members'. (IMF Survey, 2 May 1977, page 131} 
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The Cammission·must, therefore, assume responsibility for coordinating 
the dialogue between the Community and Japan (which is at present fragmented 
and, as we have seen, conducted in many different ways by the Member States), 
with the aim of achieving, by the most appropriate means and in the shortest 
possible time, an agreement between producers that embodies the principle of 
voluntary restraint on Japanese exports. However, where agreements and joint 
ventures bet~een European and Japanese undertakings are concerned, if they can 
be reconciled with national restructuring plans and a comprehensive employment 
policy, then the right of full independent action by the companies concerned 
should be maintained. 
22. The Committee on Bxternal Economic Relations endorses the section of 
Mr Bonaccini's motion for a resolution dealing with external trade policy 
(paragraphs 8 to 12). 
23. _The Committee on External Economic Relations proposes the following 
addition to Mr Bonaccini's motion for a resolution (after paragraph 8): 
'Considers it necessary for Japan to exercise short-term self-restraint 
in respect of automobile export~ to the EEC'. 
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ITALY COMPARED WITH OTHER 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
(1978) 
I ! Demand Car Population Per Capita i density GOP 
l __j 
Cars i I I i I I I 000 Index per Index 000 Index! $US I : Index : I I cars 000 I I 
-i residents units ! Italy 1,216 100 300 100 56,700 1 100 l 4, 5901 100 I I 
53,280 I I France 1,945 160 333 111 94 8, B5ol 193 I 
10,4201 Germany 2,664 219 353 118 61,330 108 227 I 
UK 1,592 131 252 84 55,900 99 5, 530[ 120 
Source: Anfia, OECD and EIU 
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I 
ANALYSIS OF TYPES OF CAR USED 
IN SOME EUROPEAN OOUNTRIES 
(% of care registered in 1979) 
100.• \432,000 , , · 1,9~0,_CCO 'J5ti3,000 -172~,000 
Luxury/Sport 5 g 12 Large/Bxecutive 6 20 
14 • 11 Medium-Large 11 
24 19 
Medium 17 31 
22 
,~,/~:· 21 
~·~.., ~ :· .. ·. j ... ~ > ··~.~~.~~: 24 Small and 'Mini' 41l ... . :. 
. 35 
15 ii; ' 
_j, 
Italy France Germany UK 
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AID GRAlft'BD BY GpMA! OOypN.MgT FOR RESEARCH 
Area 
Reduction in fuel conaumption 
Safety, noise, et~. 
New technologies 
- 56 -
'l'ype and Amount 
- 20m DM in 1978 
- 135m.DM ~~rmarked for 1979-1982 
' 
- •car of the Future' project 
110m DM for the period 
1979-1982 
- 75m DM in 1978 
- 62m DM in 1979 
PE 68. 264/fin. 
OPINION ON THE COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND EMPLOYMENT 
Draftsman: Mr G. BARBAGLI 
On 29 October 1980 the Committee on Social Affairs and Employment 
appointed Mr Barbagli draftsman. 
The committee considered the draft opinion at its meeting of 1 and 
2 December and adopted it by 10 votes to 7 with 5 abstentions. 
Present: Mr Peters, acting chairman: Mr Frischmann, vice-chairman; 
Mr Barbagli, draftsman: Mr Boyes, Mr Calvez, Mrs Cassanmagnago Cerretti, 
Mr Ceravolo, Mrs Clwyd, Mr Dalsass (deputizing for Mr Nordlohne), 
Miss De Valera, Mr Estgen, Mr MCCartin, Mrs T. Nielsen, Mr Oehler, 
Mr Pininfarina, Mr Prag, Mr Salisch, Mr Sarre, Mr Spencer, Mr J. D. Taylor, 
Mr Verhaegen and Mr Vernimmen (deputizing for Mr van Minnen). 
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The Committee on Social Affairs and Employment invites the Committee 
on Economic and Monetary Affairs, as the committee responsible, to include 
in its resolution the following points: 
1. Is alarmed at the serious difficulties which, though different in 
nature and extent in the various manufacturing countries, are 
confronting the European_car industry as a result of a number of 
economic and structural factors, namely: 
a) the fall in demand in the most important markets due to the economic 
recession, 
b) the shifts in demand itself which, because of the continual rises 
in oil prices and the high density of car ownership in industrialized 
countries, is moving steadily, even in the American market, towards 
vehicles which use less fuel and is thus pr?ducing an increased need 
for changes in product specifications, 
c) the growing success in the various markets of products from third 
countries, especially Japan, and the consequent worsening of the 
conditions of competition7 
2. Stresses, on the other hand, the extreme importance, from the Community's 
social and economic point of view, of the car sector which in fact 
represents: 
a) approximately 6 million jobs either directly or indirectly, 
b) between 5% and 8%, depending on the country! of total industrial 
output, 
c) one of the main markets for the steel, glass and rubber industries, 
d) between 8% and 12% of industrial exports: 
3. Notes that the difficulties in the industrial and commercial fields, 
arising from shrinking markets and the need to rationalize production, 
have already begun to have an effect in the employment field with a series 
of measures aimed at limiting or cutting back on staff in the following 
ways, depending on the circumstances: 
a) mass redundancies, 
b) lay-offs or short-time working, 
c) measures aimed at providing early retirement and/or encouraging 
voluntary redunda~cies: 
4. Fears that these difficulties may lead to a crisis situation similar 
to that which took the Community by surprise in the iron and steel, 
textile, and shipbuilding sectors: 
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s. Points out, therefore, that it is imperative that the Community 
implement its own measures or, at least, coordinate national 
policies in order to protect and increase the competitiveness and the 
productivity of the European car industry and to ensure that, with a 
view to guaranteeing employment, countries that export cars to the EEC 
are persuaded to set up p:-oduction plants on canmunity territory: 
' 6. Considers that, if this is to be achieved, the most advanced technology 
should be introduced and negotiations held with the third countries, 
notably Japan, the United States and the state-trading countries, to 
ensure that trade is not distorted, to the detriment of the European 
automobile industry, by unjustifiable competitive practices: 
7. Points out in this connection that, as regards trade within the 
community, competition between differentEuropean producers may 
be distorted by, among other things, the divergent legislation on 
employment and industrial relations in force in Member countries, 
and requests that the Community adopt measures particularly aimed at 
harmonizing social legislation and standardizing annual working hours 
and the conditions governing overtime: 
8. Is firmly convinced that the rationalization and modernization of 
1 
the car industry,and indeed other industries, cannot be divorced from 
an appropriate social policy at Communi'ty level which should be drawn 
up and implemented in consultation with both sides of industry and, 
which, with the objective of at least safeg?arding employment levels, 
should be based on measures such as the following: 
a) studies on th~ likely impact of restructuring and the introduction 
of new technologies on employment, 
b) definition of new professional qualifications necessitated by 
technological developments so that national and Community measures 
in the fields of training and professional retraining can be developed 
accordingly, 
c)' evaluation of the implications of investment for employment, 
d) support for achieving mobility of labour through, in part, the 
creation of jobs in sectors that offer develpment prospects such as 
data processing, avionics and automation: national investment and 
the various Community financing instruments should be directed to 
these areas and the necessary changes madBin the educational and 
vocation training sectors, 
e) implementation of the different ways of restructuring working time 
considered in the Council of Ministers' Resolution of 18 December .19791 
particularly regarding flexible retirement which, among other things, 
may promote youth employment: 
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9. Also considers that, in order to assist workers affected by restructuring 
in industrial sectors hit by crises or difficulties, it is absolutely 
essential that at the earliest possible opportunity the Commission should 
propose and the council adopt - on the basis of Article 3 (3) of 
Regulation (EEC) No. 2396/71 as amended by Regulation (EEC) No. 2893/771 
on the reform of the European Social Fund - the incorporation of new 
provisions into the Fund making finance available to: 
i. maintain the income of persons who have lost their employment, 
or have been _put on short time, or temporarily laid off and who 
are awaiting training or employment, 
ii. help to inform, guide and requalify persons seeking re-employment, 
iii. promote employment in regions where the decline in the dominant 
activity creates a serious and prolonged imb&lance in employment: 
10. Strongly recommends that the council adopt at the earliest possible 
opportunity the proposal for a regulation on Community aid for industrial 
restructuring and conversion operations2, taking into account the opiftion 
delivered by the European Parliament on the matter3 : this firmly expressed 
commitment should set a precedent for combating European crises and 
difficulties with measures taken at Community level and in a spirit of 
Community solidarity: 
11. Finally, enjoins the Cammission to take ac·count of the need to formulate 
and implement a comprehensive Community social and economic strategy that 
1 
2 
3 
is able to combat effectively the serious problem of structural unemploy-
ment, which has reached extremely disturbing levels: states emphatically 
that, without such a strategy, the traditional instruments will be in-
sufficient to remedy the adverse social effects of the restructuring of 
the automobile sector, which would then add to the persi·stent effects of a 
similar nature that have already become apparent following the restructuring 
of other sectors. 
See OJ No. L 337, 27.12.1977 
See OJ No. c 272, 16.1.1978 
See OJ No. c. 127, 21.5 .1979, page 52 
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